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Abstract 
 
Natural resources are expected to worsen institutional quality, thus slowing economic growth. In this 
paper, we investigate the link between institutional quality, natural resources, and economic growth. 
We used a panel data of 117 countries, growth relevant IRCG, institutional quality indicators, and 
apply the system generalized method of moments. Our results confirm that institutional quality 
promotes economic growth. We found that natural resource slows down the growth-inducing impact 
institutional quality only in for corruption and democratic accountability, thus confirming the idea 
of the natural resource curse. Natural resources were, however, found to enhance the institutions 
induced economic growth for all other indicators except corruption, democratic accountability, and 
bureaucracy, thus confirming the idea of so-called natural resource blessing. The results are robust 
for two model specifications and across two different indicators of natural resource abundance, 
namely, natural resource exports and natural resource rents. 
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1. Introduction: 
 
Natural resources are a great wealth for a nation. The political economy of a resource rich country 
is generally dominated by resource induced interactions. The economic progress is determined by 
the successful capitalization of the resource. Institutions in general have a direct bearing on economic 
growth through its instruments such as bureaucracy, regulatory bodies, the judiciary and financial 
institutions. The institutions play an instrumental role in achieving resource induced progress leading 
to positive economic growth. In this paper, we will engage in a quantitative analysis to test the above 
condition presented. The research has been broken down into streams along the institutional 
channel, wherein we study the interaction between institutions and economic growth, natural 
resources, and both combined. 
 
The Neoclassical growth posits that the main drivers of economic growth are investment, 
human capital, and technological adoption. This is predominantly dictated by the utilitarian concept, 
wherein the rationality and creating choices driven by freedom as its central tenet. The only 
institution that neoclassical theory vouches for is the market, where the individuals are profit 
maximisers (based on hedonistic characteristics). To accentuate economic growth, human capital is 
a pivotal pillar in conjunction with technology adoption. Therefore, to have an effective work force, 
necessary skills must be made available to the populace to create an ecosystem where the human 
capital can be efficiently monetized in sync with technological innovation. To create such an 
ecosystem, the presence of a functioning institution is imperative since they can effectively enforce 
the social contract, hence laying fertile grounds for enhanced economic activity. According to North 
(1991), Institutions provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes 
the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation, or decline. An encouraging economic 
growth can emerge in the interplay of economic and political institutions, where the latter seeks less 
rents and attributes power to groups that have ab acumen for property rights enforcement, and the 
will to create effective constraints for power holders (Acemoglu, et al. 2005). 
 
Firstly, we would like to discuss the concept Natural Resource Curse since it is the backbone 
of our research. Natural Resource curse is a phenomenon that states that the economic growth of a 
resource rich country will be lower than that of a resource scarce one. Therefore, it can be stated 
that the Resource abundance leads to a Dutch Disease effect leading to exchange rate overvaluation 
and consequently impacting other sectors of the economy (Sachs & Warner, 2001). The most 
important dimension supporting the curse is that of the institutional channel, which is the catharsis 
of our research. The institutional quality is negatively impacted due to the abundance of natural 
resources. Empirical studies conducted by Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian (2012) show that Nigeria, a 
resource rich country in Oil, has not seen the growth it desired because of institutional failure. 
Further study by Auty (1995) show the discrepancy in the economic performance between Sub 
Saharan Africa, Latin American countries, and East Asian Countries owing to cultural factors 
(Political Regime) and environmental factors such as natural resource endowment and urbanization. 
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In this paper, we reinvestigate the presence of natural resource curse through the channel of 
institutional quality.  
 
After establishing the above claims that institutions are imperative for economic growth and 
that natural resource curse is a channel that can impede economic progress through its overarching 
effect on Institutional quality. Though the relationship between natural resources, institutional 
quality, and economic growth is extensively researched, in this paper, we make an original 
contribution in the following ways. Earlier studies on the topic have been specifically region focused 
(see, for instance, Subramanian & Xala-i-Martin 2012; Raggl, 2017, Brahim, Laylia, & Badreddine, 
2017) and many of the existing studies1 used WGI2 indicators of institutional quality which are 
inconsistent3 across countries and across time. Therefore, the use of these indicators in a longitudinal 
data is not desirable. This paper attempts to make an original contribution to the natural resources 
curse literature in the following ways. This paper uses a large dataset of 117 countries and uses a 
more consistent institutional quality indicator of IRCG and uses two different natural resources 
indicators, namely, natural resources exports and natural resources rents, to investigate the 
relationship between natural resources, institutional quality and economic growth. The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and variables, section 3 presents the 
data and methodology used, section 4 presents our results and discussion. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. Model Specification and variables 
The objective of this study is to investigate the presence of any significant impact of institutional 
quality on the economic growth of the country. This study further aims to investigate the presence 
of natural resource curses through the channel of institutional quality deterioration. This section 
describes the econometric models used in this paper. In the first step, this paper uses the following 
simple dynamic panel data (DPD) model to estimate the potential role of institutional quality 
measures on the economic growth of the country. The adopted model is like the one used by 
Azman-Saini et al. (2010) and Gui-Diby (2014). 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡        (2.1) 
where    𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Yit is the real growth rate of GDP per capita; INST is the IRCG institutional quality indicator. Y it-1 is 
the lagged value of real GDP growth per capita. Xit represents all the exogenous control variables 
included in the model estimations. These variables include initial GDP, gross domestic investment, 
 
1 see for instance Subramanian & Xala-i-Martin 2012, Brahim, Laylia, & Badreddine, 2017  
2 WGI indicators can be accessed at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc-intro 
3 The WGI methodology section describes it in the following way “Changes over time in a country’s score on the WGI 
reflect a combination of three factors (i) changes in the underlying source data, (ii) the addition of new data sources for a 
country that are only available in the more recent period, and (iii) changes in the weights used to aggregate the individual 
sources.” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents#wgiDataCrossCtry 
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human capital, international trade openness, inflation, government consumption, spending, 
population growth rate. 
To control the initial measure of economic development of a country, the variable of initial 
GDP has been included in the model to lend it. The initial measure of economic development of a 
country will be controlled by the initial GDP and hence has been included in the model. According 
to Neoclassical Growth theory, the pivotal pillars of economic growth are labor, capital, and 
technology. The narratives of the neoclassical models of economic growth lay a strong emphasis on 
the inversely proportional relationship between the magnitude of economic development and 
economic growth (Solow, 1956; Barro, 1991, 1998). Further Studies (see, for example, Mauro, 1995; 
Carkovic & Levine, 2002; Feng 2003) state that the rate of growth of poorer countries is faster than 
that of richer countries. This is the bedrock for the theory of Economic Convergence that suggests 
low diminishing returns for richer countries and numerous studies claim it. The variable Initial GDP 
is defined as the logarithmic value of real GDP per capita for the first year of each five-year subgroup 
of the dataset. The wheels of economic growth are set in motion by domestic investment. The market 
indicates the positive effects produced by Gross Domestic Investment on economic growth and 
studies by Levine & Renelt (1992), Feng (2003), Alfaro et al. (2004), and Kormendi & Meguire 
(1985) support the claim. Investment as a percentage of GDP as an instrument of investment was 
used by these studies. In our study, to further substantiate the claim, a control variable has been 
introduced, which is the ratio of the domestic investments to GDP in the model, which is expected 
to have a positive impact on economic growth. The second factor to affect a positive impact on 
economic growth is Human Capital. Human Capital is the effective workforce which is the means 
to reach economic growth. Numerous Empirical Studies have reported the positive impacts of 
Human Capital on economic growth. To measure the impact of Human Capital, we are using Gross 
secondary enrolment as a proxy variable following the studies by Adams (2009) and Gui-Diby (2014). 
Following variable selection, we lay the hypotheses that Human Capital is instrumental in positive 
economic growth. 
There are conflicting studies illustrating the causal effect of inflation on economic growth. 
According to Tobin-Mundell hypothesis, economic growth has a growth(broadening) potential due 
to an anticipated inflation leading to portfolio adjustment. These adjustments lead to reduced interest 
rates, proliferating investments leading to positive effects on economic growth. However, there are 
studies contrary to this argument as proposed by Barro (1995) who talks about price stability that 
states economic growth is negatively impacted by inflation. In this study, we consider that inflation 
will positively influence the consumer price index (CPI) and consequently will impact economic 
growth negatively. The study by Alcala and Ciccone, 2004 inferred that international trade openness 
has a positive impact on labor productivity due to an appreciation in the areas of specialization and 
competition. Just to further testify the claim that trade as a Ricardian logic leads to comparative 
advantage and consequently enhancing specialization and inducing economic efficiency. To further 
corroborate the claim trade openness positively impacts economic growth, there are empirical 
studies by Harrison (1996); Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2003) supporting the 
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claim. In order to measure the trade openness, we will be using the ratio between imports and 
exports of goods and services to GDP as established from studies by Frankel and Romer (1999). 
Economic Growth is not directly impacted by the Government Spending Consumption (GSC) since 
the latter doesn’t influence the private productivity. Going further into the rationale, it can be said 
that economic growth is negatively impacted on two grounds which are the lowering of savings and 
distortionary effect of GSC. Barro (1995) proposed that government spending as a percent of GDP 
showed to have a negative impact on economic growth. Further studies by Butkiewicz and 
Yankikhaya (2011) portray a similar negative correlation between government spending, 
consumption, and economic growth. There are studies such as Dao (2014) which show an 
ambiguous relationship between Government consumption Spending and economic growth due to 
the heterogeneity in the quality of governance around the world. Primarily, we will be using the Barro 
(1995) indicator which is government consumption spending as percent of GDP in our study. It can 
be argued that good institutions provide fertile grounds to amplify economic growth. The quality of 
Institutions has a deterministic impact on economic growth. Studies by Jude and Levieuge (2015) 
have put forth a case that clearly shows that the quality of institution can be a major cog in the wheel 
to appropriate better economic performance. Empirical studies, especially from developing 
countries, further testify the role of institutions in economic and sustainability development. Study 
conducted in Africa by Fayissa and Nsiah (2013) clearly show that the parameter quality of 
institutions plays an instrumental role in successfully implementing sustainable economic growth 
objectives and therefore good governance will set wheels to development. To analyze the case 
further, corruption will be used to gauge institutional quality and Mo (2001) established the spillover 
effect of corruption on economic growth and consequently a deterministic relationship is found 
between them. Governance and quality of institutions as variables induce a positive impact on 
economic growth and this relationship was found by Knack and Keefer (1995) using the 
International Country Risk guide (ICRG) and Business Environmental Risk Indicator (BERI). 
Corruption, laws and order will be used as indicators for portraying the quality of institutions 
categorized as IRCG indicators following the studies of Knack and Keefer (1995). The Neoclassical 
growth models suggest that increase in population growth leads to a decrease in the growth of output 
per capita. Solow (1956) pioneered in introducing the role of population growth in assessing 
economic growth. The theoretical argument that population growth has a negative impact on 
economic growth finds further credibility in studies by Studies like Barro (1998), Feng (2003), Alfaro 
et al. (2004), Gui-Diby (2014), Jude &amp; Levieuge (2015), and Bucci (2015).We will establish a 
negative correlation between the rate of annual population growth and economic growth similar to 
Alfaro et al.(2004).  
In the second model described below, natural resources and the interaction term between 
natural resources and FDI inflow are included to find out if the presence of natural resources in the 
country alters the FDI-growth relationship. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃 𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑 (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡  (2.2) 
where    𝜂𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡
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NRit is the indicator for natural resources. In this paper, we use two separate natural resources 
indicators, namely, natural resource exports (as a percentage of goods exports) (NR Exports) and 
natural resources rents (as a percentage of total GDP) (NR Rents). Studies exploring the impact of 
natural resource abundance on productivity (e.g., Sachs & Warner, 2001) have used the share of 
natural resources in goods export as an indicator of the size of the natural resources sector.  
According to Darlington (1990), there always exists a multicollinearity problem with the interaction 
term since it shows a strong correlation with the variables used to determine the term and similar 
findings have dotted the interaction term 2.2 used in our research. Burill (2007) proposed a two-step 
procedure to cater to this problem. Initially, the term INST X NR is regressed on INST and NR 
exports variables and then the residuals from this regression are used instead of the interaction term. 
There, two steps are needed to cater to this problem. This procedure is consistent across the paper 
wherever the interaction term is used. All other variables are the same as described.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
In this section, we are going to describe the data and methods used in this paper.  
 
3.1  Data 
 
The data used in the model estimation is purely based on the availability of data sets for the selected 
countries. The model presented above uses a dynamic panel data of 117 countries with the related 
period range being 1992-2016 for the estimations. The selected variables as indicators of institutional 
quality that are the IRCG Institutional Indicators published by Political Risk Group (PRS). The 
advantage of the IRCG model is the related flexibility provided in assessing risk to cater to one's own 
model. Therefore, the model presented above uses 12 indicators for assessing institutional quality 
with varying range of scores for each indicator independently. In this model, we use a hybrid 
approach for the estimation of both the individual and combined study of the indicators. For the 
combined approach, we are using the Institutional Quality Index (IQI) as the sum of the scores of 
indicators for each country. The data for the macroeconomic indicators that are trade openness, 
FDI inflow, GDP per capita, real GDP per capita growth rate, and natural resources exports are the 
World development indicators (WDI) part of the World Bank Databank. To study the case of 
human capital as a pillar of economic growth, our model uses the Enrollment rate which is the Gross 
secondary enrollment rate and the data for the same is obtained from UNESCO Institute of Statistics 
(UIS). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
GDP Growth 3119 2.149 5.127 -62.378 121.78 
NR Exports 3094 28.391 30.865 0 99.791 
NR Rents 3119 8.313 11.896 0 68.778 
Domestic Investment  3119 23.763 7.365 -.693 58.151 
Initial GDP  3119 14058.167 18809.333 0 107235.27 
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Govt Spending 3094 15.591 5.346 .911 55.55 
Trade Openness 3119 82.515 52.841 .021 442.62 
Population growth 3119 1.5 1.571 -4.537 17.511 
Inflation rate 3070 33.621 469.857 -16.117 23773.131 
Enrollment rate 3094 74.553 31.971 6 164 
      
Institutional indicators      
Bureaucracy  3050 2.27 1.087 0 4 
Corruption  3119 2.896 1.283 0 6 
Democratic Accountability 3119 3.976 1.622 0 6 
Ethnic Tension 3119 4.093 1.291 0 6 
External Conflict 3119 10.081 1.486 2.21 12 
Govt Stability 3119 8.056 1.768 1 12 
Internal Conflict 3119 9.296 1.963 0 12 
Investor Profile 3119 7.96 2.347 1 12 
Law Order 3119 3.866 1.357 0 6 
Military in Politics 3119 3.904 1.761 0 6 
Religious Tension 3119 4.675 1.304 0 6 
 
3.2  Methodology  
In this section, we describe the methodology used in the estimation of the model described in the 
section above.  
This paper adopts a dynamic panel data model and the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation method to investigate the impact of institutional quality on economic growth. 
Following studies like Gui-Diby (2014), Feeny et al. (2014), and Adams & Opoku (2015), this paper 
adopted the system generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) to estimate the models described 
in the section above. SYS-GMM is preferred over the difference generalized method of moment 
(DIFF-GMM) because DIFF-GMM is found to perform poorly in the presence of time series and 
Bond et.al (2001) found DIFF-GMM to provide weak instruments. SYS-GMM provides estimation 
efficiency by including additional instruments (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). 
This paper uses XTABOND2 command for STATA developed by Roodman (2009a) for the 
estimation of SYS-GMM models. The estimation results for this paper are produced using STATA 
version 14.0. 
To test the validity of the instruments for each regression, the Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions is conducted, and the results are provided in each table. Similarly, to test for the 
autocorrelation, the Arellano-Bond test of order two AR (2) is performed for each regression, and 
the results are provided in each table.  
4. Results and discussion 
 
 7 
This section is dedicated to the discussion of our results and findings. Table 1 provides with the 
descriptive statistics of all the variables used in our model. In the succeeding section (Table 2), we 
analyze the estimations that show the impact of institutional quality on economic growth. The 
institutional quality indicators are used to represent the relationship between institutions and 
economic growth. In the next section, we introduce the variable natural resources to investigate the 
natural resources curse taking place through the channel of institutional quality. For this purpose, 
we use two institutional quality indicators, namely, natural resources curse and natural resources 
rent. The results are presented in tables 3 and 4 for natural resources exports and natural resources 
rents, respectively. 
 
Table 2 presents our basic results where we estimate the impact of institutional quality on 
the economic growth of the country. The table presents the results (columns 1-8) with 8 growth 
relevant indicators of institutional quality produced by PRS.   
 
The main results of our interest is the coefficients of institutional quality indicators. Our 
results indicate that the coefficients of all institutional quality indicators are positive except that of 
democratic accountability. The coefficient of bureaucracy is found to be positive, however, 
insignificant. These results are in line with the existing literature on the positive impact of institutional 
quality. Peng et al. (2008) found that good quality of institutions enables firms to invest and innovate, 
thus leading to competition and growth. Mauro (1995) found that corruption lowers investments 
thus causing economic growth to slow down. Similarly, Hayat and Cahlik (2017) found that 
corruption and rules of law & order are significant determinants of economic growth. 
 
The role of the military in politics from the point of view of growth is still debated and the 
empirical research is not very clear on that. McKinlay & Cohan (1975) found a heterogeneous levels 
of economic performance both in military and civilian governments. Our results show a positive 
coefficient of the variable military in politics, thus reinforcing the idea of lack of military interference 
in politics improves growth performance.  
 
The coefficient of democratic accountability is found to be significant and negative, which 
would be considered unexpected. However, the lack of democratic accountability could provide 
investors with certainty and long-term stability. Zheng (2014) argues that the lack of democratic 
accountability enables China to enact bold reforms and provide a credible environment for 
investment and growth. The rest of the results are very much as expected. The coefficient of initial 
GDP, population growth rate, government spending is found to be negative and statistically 
significant while the coefficient of investment, trade openness, and enrollment rate were found to be 
positive and significant. 
Now that we have determined the growth enhancing impact of institutional quality, we 
investigate the presence of natural resource curse taking place through the institutional quality by 
introducing natural resource exports and an interaction term of natural resource curse and 
institutional quality (NR Exports X Institutions). We ran two different model specifications for each 
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of the institutional quality indicators. The results are presented in table. 3.  
The interaction term for NR and bureaucracy is negative, however, insignificant, while the 
interaction term for NR and corruption is negative and statistically significant, indicating a negative 
impact on the corruption (controlling) and growth relationship. This indicates the presence of natural 
resource curse taking place through worsening of corruption level.  
Corruption tends to create a dead weight loss in the institutional and economical frameworks 
and impedes the resource allocation equitably. Therefore, it can be said from the perspective of 
corruption that it induces a principal and agent problem in the institutional framework. Alfada (2019) 
found a strong growth deteriorating the impact of corruption. The problem is proliferated further 
by the presence of natural resources, as there is an unequal distribution of proceeds from the 
resource utilization at the agent side and an insinuating impact on the principal due to the rent 
seeking behavior of the agent. The rent seeking behavior is further aggravated with a horde to 
accumulate the maximum share of the resource capital rather than the productive and efficient usage 
of the capital itself. There is another aspect to this conundrum that portrays the factor of patronage 
additionally to rent seeking that further exacerbates the problem of resource curse , wherein the 
agent shows proclivity to control the decision making and create a favorable nepotist environment 
and hence creating an atmosphere of unequitable profit sharing from the resources. This is one 
major dimension which impacts the effective utilization of resources and thins the list of 
beneficiaries(principal). Our findings of natural resources curse taking place through the enhanced 
corruption levels is in line with earlier studies that show natural resources abundance leading to 
increased corruption levels (Arezki & Bruckner 2011). Similarly, Thus, our results confirm the 
presence of natural resource curse taking place by altering the corruption and growth relationship.  
 
Another interesting observation is the negative coefficient of the interaction term between 
democratic accountability and natural resource exports. Democratic accountability was not a 
significant determinant of economic growth in our earlier results. however, this negative coefficient 
of its interaction term with the natural resource indicates the presence of a negative impact of 
democratic accountability on economic growth. This shows that while democratic accountability is 
not a determinant of growth in general, in a resource rich countries, it tends to slow down economic 
growth. However, for all the remaining institutional quality indicators, our study found no adverse 
impact on the intuitions-growth relationship, thus rejecting the presence of natural resource curses 
taking place through those indicators. On the contrary, our study found that natural resources 
exports enhance the growth inducing the impact of all the remaining institutional quality indicators. 
For the robustness of our results, we estimated the same model with an interaction terms with natural 
resource rents instead of natural resource exports. We present those estimated results in table 4. 
The results are consistent across both natural resource indicators.  
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Table 2. Institutional quality and economic growth: System generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) estimates 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of Real GDP rate per capita 
VARIABLES Bureaucracy Corruption 
External 
Conflict 
Internal 
Conflict 
Government 
Stability 
Investor 
Profile 
Military in 
Politics 
Religious 
Tension 
Democratic 
Accountabilit
y 
Log (Initial GDP) -1.962* -2.717*** -1.556*** -2.315*** -0.706*** -1.518*** -2.786*** -1.618*** 2.038* 
 (1.168) (0.464) (0.243) (0.308) (0.120) (0.443) (0.577) (0.250) (1.084) 
Investment  0.150*** 0.171*** 0.146*** 0.078*** 0.107*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.170*** 0.055 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.034) 
Govt Spending 
-0.104*** -0.172*** -0.133*** -0.205*** -0.110*** -0.115*** -0.388*** -0.127*** -0.039 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029) (0.022) (0.025) (0.079) (0.023) (0.032) 
Trade Openness 
0.002 0.004** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.001 -0.003 -0.012*** -0.001 -0.029** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.014) 
Enrollment rate 
0.010 0.011* 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.014** 0.002 -0.034*** 0.008 0.064*** 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.023) 
Inflation rate -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population growth rate 
-0.471*** -0.383*** -0.298*** -0.092 -0.800*** -0.689*** 0.129 0.467** -2.470*** 
(0.169) (0.086) (0.099) (0.111) (0.078) (0.076) (0.203) (0.238) (0.770) 
Institutions 2.805 4.583*** 4.360*** 3.229*** 1.266*** 1.451** 4.901*** 5.010*** -7.593** 
 (2.611) (0.950) (0.921) (0.523) (0.255) (0.640) (1.240) (1.041) (3.157) 
          
Sargan test p- 0.111 0.161 0.367 0.808 0.725 0.598 0.625 0.128 0.77 
AB AR (2) test p-value 0.155 0.437 0.16 0.549 0.403 0.058 0.571 0.337 0.277 
No of Instruments 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
No of Countries 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 
No of Observations 2,820 2,867 2,867 2,867 2,867 2,867 2,867 2,867 2,867 
All regressions include a constant term. Standard errors in parentheses. All the regression models are estimated with the system generalized method of moments specific 
homoscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent robust standard errors. The A-B AR (2) test has a null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the residuals 
while the Sargan test has the null hypothesis of joint exogeneity of the instruments set. Rejecting the null hypothesis of both tests provides support for the consistency of 
models. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table. 3 Institutional quality, natural resources and economic growth: System generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) estimates,  
Dependent variable: Growth rate of Real GDP rate per capita  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Bureaucracy  Corruption  External Conflict Internal Conflict Government Stability 
log (Initial GDP) -0.835*** -1.600*** -0.604*** -0.425** -0.646*** -0.670*** -0.702*** -0.758*** -0.687*** -0.674*** 
 (0.175) (0.348) (0.140) (0.199) (0.121) (0.124) (0.137) (0.145) (0.120) (0.121) 
Domestic Investment 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.137*** 0.135*** 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.126*** 0.130*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Government 
Spending   
-0.076*** -0.097*** -0.078*** -0.066*** -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.088*** -0.086*** 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Trade Openness 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Enrollment rate 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.011* 0.010* 0.010 0.010* 0.012* 0.013** 0.010 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Inflation rate 0.001 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 
rate 
-0.615*** -0.652*** -0.642*** -0.614*** -0.583*** -0.601*** -0.586*** -0.603*** -0.860*** -0.846*** 
(0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.074) (0.071) (0.074) (0.076) (0.077) (0.083) (0.084) 
Institutions 0.183 1.761** -0.025 -0.368 0.286* 0.341** 0.193 0.265* 0.328*** 0.348*** 
 (0.302) (0.689) (0.176) (0.324) (0.162) (0.173) (0.131) (0.145) (0.095) (0.097) 
NR Exports X 
Institutions 
-0.036 -0.016 -0.068*** -0.105*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.000 0.001 0.066*** 0.072*** 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.025) (0.038) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
NR Exports  0.019**  -0.008  0.003  0.004  -0.005 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Sargan test p-value 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 
AB AR(2) test p-value 0.451 0.469 0.250 0.380 0.099 0.101 0.026 0.028 0.976 0.895 
No of Instruments 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
No of Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
No of Observations 2,796 2,796 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 
All regressions include a constant term. Standard errors in parentheses. All the regression models are estimated with the system generalized method of moments specific
homoscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent robust standard errors. The A-B AR (2) test has a null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the residuals
the Sargan test has the null hypothesis of join exogeneity of the instruments set. Rejecting the null hypothesis of both tests provide support for the consistency of mode
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Continued… 
Variables 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Investor Profile Military in Politics Religious Tension Democratic Accountability 
log (Initial GDP) -0.844*** -0.891*** -0.726*** -1.169*** -0.617*** -0.739*** -0.601*** -1.131*** 
 (0.139) (0.144) (0.151) (0.225) (0.128) (0.147) (0.132) (0.272) 
Domestic Investment  0.122*** 0.119*** 0.125*** 0.116*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Government Spending -0.078*** -0.080*** -0.099*** -0.150*** -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.083*** -0.097*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
Trade Openness 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Enrollment rate 0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Inflation rate -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth rate -0.732*** -0.766*** -0.575*** -0.542*** -0.593*** -0.551*** -0.588*** -0.451*** 
 (0.086) (0.090) (0.078) (0.080) (0.088) (0.092) (0.084) (0.105) 
Institutions 0.386*** 0.430*** 0.311 1.198*** 0.173 0.683* -0.123 -1.433** 
 (0.115) (0.120) (0.226) (0.402) (0.245) (0.390) (0.173) (0.611) 
NR Exports X Institutions 0.024* 0.024* 0.011 0.045* 0.016 0.042 -0.093*** -0.112*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) 
NR Exports  0.005  0.016***  0.009*  0.028** 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.012) 
Sargan test p-value 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.11 0.11 
AB AR(2) test p-value 0.064 0.065 0.099 0.093 0.121 0.134 0.274 0.299 
No of Instruments 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
No of Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
No of Observations 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 
All regressions include a constant term. Standard errors in parentheses. All the regression models are estimated with the system generalized method of mom
specific homoscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent robust standard errors. The A-B AR (2) test has a null hypothesis of no second-order serial correla
the residuals while the Sargan test has the null hypothesis of join exogeneity of the instruments set. Rejecting the null hypothesis of both tests provide supp
the consistency of models. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table. 4 Institutional quality, natural resources and economic growth: System generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) estimates  
Dependent variable: Growth rate of Real GDP rate per capita 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Bureaucracy  Corruption  External Conflict Internal Conflict Government Stability 
log (Initial GDP) -0.841*** -1.952*** -0.645*** -0.868*** -0.650*** -0.717*** -0.739*** -0.844*** -0.645*** -0.654*** 
 (0.177) (0.323) (0.140) (0.166) (0.121) (0.124) (0.136) (0.143) (0.118) (0.118) 
Domestic Investment 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.117*** 0.133*** 0.131*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Government 
Spending   
-0.071*** -0.110*** -0.086*** -0.101*** -0.086*** -0.093*** -0.087*** -0.098*** -0.086*** -0.088*** 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Trade Openness 0.004** 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Enrollment rate 0.014** 0.021*** 0.011* 0.014** 0.011* 0.014** 0.012** 0.016*** 0.008 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Inflation rate -0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 
rate 
-0.627*** -0.786*** -0.616*** -0.716*** -0.599*** -0.678*** -0.555*** -0.625*** -0.806*** -0.829*** 
(0.072) (0.081) (0.070) (0.081) (0.071) (0.078) (0.075) (0.080) (0.080) (0.084) 
Institutions 0.232 2.517*** 0.092 0.500** 0.247 0.400** 0.237* 0.370*** 0.431*** 0.416*** 
 (0.308) (0.636) (0.180) (0.244) (0.169) (0.180) (0.128) (0.140) (0.106) (0.107) 
NR Rents X 
Institutions 
0.106 0.104 -0.064 -0.005 0.029 0.025 0.052** 0.047* 0.138*** 0.132*** 
(0.085) (0.084) (0.081) (0.085) (0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) 
NR Rents  0.109***  0.044**  0.033**  0.033**  0.011 
  (0.027)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Sargan test p-value 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.22 
AB AR(2) test p-value 0.385 0.638 0.244 0.182 0.116 0.145 0.48 0.067 0.796 0.824 
No of Instruments 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
No of Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
No of Observations 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 
All regressions include a constant term. Standard errors in parentheses. All the regression models are estimated with the system generalized method of moments 
specific homoscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent robust standard errors. The A-B AR (2) test has a null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in 
the residuals while the Sargan test has the null hypothesis of join exogeneity of the instruments set. Rejecting the null hypothesis of both tests provide support for 
the consistency of models. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Continued… 
Variables 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Investor Profile Military in Politics Religious Tension Democratic Accountability 
log (Initial GDP) -0.844*** -0.891*** -0.726*** -1.169*** -0.617*** -0.739*** -0.601*** -1.131*** 
 (0.139) (0.144) (0.151) (0.225) (0.128) (0.147) (0.132) (0.272) 
Domestic Investment  0.122*** 0.119*** 0.125*** 0.116*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Government Spending -0.078*** -0.080*** -0.099*** -0.150*** -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.083*** -0.097*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
Trade Openness 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Enrollment rate 0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Inflation rate -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth rate -0.732*** -0.766*** -0.575*** -0.542*** -0.593*** -0.551*** -0.588*** -0.451*** 
 (0.086) (0.090) (0.078) (0.080) (0.088) (0.092) (0.084) (0.105) 
Institutions 0.386*** 0.430*** 0.311 1.198*** 0.173 0.683* -0.123 -1.433** 
 (0.115) (0.120) (0.226) (0.402) (0.245) (0.390) (0.173) (0.611) 
NR Rents X Institutions 0.024* 0.024* 0.011 0.045* 0.016 0.042 -0.093*** -0.112*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) 
NR Rents  0.005  0.016***  0.009*  0.028** 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.012) 
Sargan test p-value 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.19 
AB AR(2) test p-value 0.076 0.089 0.157 0.093 0.196 0.340 0.217 0.294 
No of Instruments 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
No of Countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
No of Observations 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,843 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The institutional quality is a necessary cog in the wheel to stimulate an environment of trust and 
safeguarding of transactions in an economy. Through legal, financial, and social frameworks, 
institutions can create an efficient resource utilization mechanism to propel economic growth. 
According to our findings, institutional quality does have a positive impact on the economic growth.  
 
While we engaged in the discussion to prove the hypothesis that institutional quality a 
necessary driver of economy, we further investigated how natural resources abundance alter that 
institutional quality-economic growth relationship. The investigation led us to corroborate the claims 
of the natural resource curse on institutions only in case of corruption and democratic accountability. 
In all other institutions natural resources abundance boosted their ability to enhance economic 
growth.  
 
Natural resources curse in literature is explained to take place through two main channels. 
Firstly, through the worsening the institutional quality which leads to slowing down economic growth. 
Secondly, the decline in competitiveness of the manufacturing exports which is caused by 
appreciation of real exchange rate and the increased price levels as a result of the inflow of natural 
resources rents. one limitation of this study is that we focused solely on the institutional channel of 
natural resources curse. Our study found evidence of supporting the concept of natural resources 
curse taking place only through two institutional quality indicators namely corruption, and 
democratic accountability.  However, contrary to many existing studies on natural resources curse, 
we found evidence that natural resources curse encourages institutions induced economic growth 
for all the institutional quality indicators except for corruption, and democratic accountability, thus 
providing evidence for the idea of so-called natural resources blessing. 
 
Natural resources should ideally be a boom to a nation and its effective usage might produce 
positive externalities. Institutions catering to resource and growth relationships should design policies 
that effectively uses resources and distributes outcomes in line with social equity. The appropriate 
choices of policy instruments can mitigate the impediments in reaching a desired outcome with 
optimal utilization of resources and maximum collective utility. Trying to assess a case of a natural 
resource country that is rich in non-renewable sector. The policies designated should not only be 
catering to the utilization of the resource available, but also using it to appropriate a diversification 
drive into other economic sectors such as information technology. This not only decreases the 
country’s overt reliance on resources, but also creates an insultation from the economic shocks that 
are driven by them. Policy makers should take measures to improve the quality of institutions 
specifically controlling the level of corruption and improving democratic accountability to experience 
economic growth and prosperity as well as avoid the natural resources curse. Further policy research 
needs to be conducting in understanding and mitigating the risks associated with institutions with low 
quality. 
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Appendix I 
 
Definition of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
FDI Inflow Net FDI Inflow as a percentage of GDP measured in 2010$. UNCTAD 
GDP growth Growth Rate of Real GDP Per capita WDI 
NR Exports Percentage of Natural Resource exports in goods exports 
Fuels comprise the commodities in SITC section 3 (mineral fuels, 
lubricants, and related materials). Ores and metals comprise the 
commodities in SITC sections 27 (crude fertilizer, minerals nes); 28 
(metalliferous ores, scrap); and 68 (non-ferrous metals). 
WDI 
NR Rents Rents received from natural resources exports as a percentage of 
GDP. 
WDI 
 
Inflation rate 
 
Rate of growth of consumer price index 
 
WDI 
 
Trade Openness 
 
The sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP 
 
WDI 
 
Govt Spending 
 
Government consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
 
WDI 
 
Initial GDP 
 
The GDP per capita of the initial year of each five-year subset of the 
dataset starting 1991. 
 
WDI 
 
Population 
Growth Rate 
 
The annual growth rate of the population of the country 
 
WDI 
Domestic 
Investment 
 
 
Gross domestic capital formation as a percentage of GDP (Gross 
domestic investment) 
 
 
WDI 
Enrollment Gross secondary school enrollment rate of secondary school-going 
age  
SDG’s of 
UIS 
Corruption It evaluates the degree of corruption within the political system  PRS-IRCG 
Law & Order Quantifies Law and Order, that is, the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system 
PRS-IRCG 
 
Institutional Quality 
Variables 
  
Government 
Stability  
It measures the government’s ability to carry out its policies and to stay in 
office.  
PRS-
ICRG  
(2016)  
 
Institutional Quality 
Variables 
 
Government 
Stability  
It measures the government’s ability to carry out i s policies and to stay in 
office.  
 
Institutional Quality 
Variables 
 
Government 
Stability  
It measures the government’s ability to carry out its policies and to stay in 
office.  
 19 
Investment Profile  It assesses the investment profile, that is, factors related to the risk of an 
investment that is not covered by other (financial and economic) risk 
components, such as contract viability (expropriation), profits repatriation, 
or payment delays.  
PRS-
ICRG  
(2016)  
Corruption  It evaluates the degree of corruption within the political system  PRS-
ICRG  
(2016)  
Military in Politics  It represents the influence of the military in politics, which could signal that 
the government is unable to function effectively. Therefore, the country 
might have an unfavorable environment for business  
PRS-
ICRG  
(2016)  
Religious Tensions  Measures religious tensions, stemming from the domination of society 
and/or governance by a single religious group seeking, for instance, to 
replace civil by religious law or to exclude other religious from the political 
and social press  
PRS-
ICRG  
(2016)  
Law & Order  Quantifies Law and Order, that is, the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system.  
PRS-
ICRG  
(2016)  
Democratic 
Accountability  
Relates the democratic accountability of the government, that is, the 
responsiveness of the government to its citizens, but also fundamental civil 
liberties and political rights.  
PRS-
ICRG  
(2016)  
Bureaucracy 
Quality  
It stands for the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy, which 
might act as a shock absorber tending to reduce policy revisions if 
governments change. 
PRS-
ICRG  
(2016) 
 
Investm nt Profile  It assesses the investment profile, hat is, factors rel ted to the risk of an 
investm nt that is not covered by other (financial and economic) risk 
componen s, such as contract v ability (expropriat on), profits repatriation, 
or payment delays.  
Corruption  It evaluates the degree of corruption within the political system  
Mili ary in Politics  It r pr sents the nfluence f he military in politics, w ich could signal tha
the government is unable to function effectively. Therefore, the country 
might have an unfavorable environment for business  
Religious Tensions  Measures religious tensions, stemming from the domination of society 
and/or gove nance by a singl  reli ious group s eking, for instance, to 
replace civil by religious law o  to exclude other religious from the political 
and social press  
Law & Order  Quantifies Law and Order, that is, the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system.  
Democratic 
Accountability  
Relates the democratic accountability of the government, that is, the 
responsiveness of the governmen to its citizens, but also fundamental civil 
liberties and political rights.  
Bureaucracy 
Qual ty  
I  stands for the institutional strength and q ality of the bureaucracy, which
might act as a shock absorber tending to reduce policy revisions if
overnments change. 
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